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COMMENTS
THE "PUBLIC INTEREST OR CONCERN" TEST
- HAVE WE RESURRECTED A STANDARD
THAT SHOULD HAVE REMAINED IN
THE DEFAMATION GRAVEYARD?
INTRODUCTION
"I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced.., and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it .... ,,1 With these words, former Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart expressed the inherent difficulty in defining the
boundaries of "obscene" expressions deemed unworthy of
constitutional protection. Words alone are too often inade-
quate tools with which to sculpt constitutional constructs.
Beyond the definitional problems attending constitutional val-
ues lie competing interests. On one side, the first and four-
teenth amendments protect free expression.2 On the other
side, states may have a legitimate interest in protecting their
citizens from "harmful" speech.
Beginning with the landmark case of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,4 the United States Supreme Court has struggled to
outline the boundaries of constitutionally protected speech
within the area of defamation law.5 The "balance" has alter-
nately favored first amendment press and speech rights and
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ......
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See, e.g., Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 195.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. At common law, libel (defamatory written or printed communication) and slan-
der (defamatory spoken words or transitory gestures) were considered separate torts.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). Technological advances in com-
munication have blurred these distinctions and rendered them largely obsolete.
Although some common law distinctions remain, this Comment refers to "defamation"
which encompasses both oral and printed communication.
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individual rights to redress reputational harm.6 The balance
currently appears to weigh more favorably on the side of indi-
vidual reputational interests.'
There are two general approaches to constitutional analy-
sis in defamation law. One approach examines the subject
matter of the defamatory publication. The precise inquiry
varies, but the primary focus centers on whether the content
of the defamatory publication (or the surrounding issues) is
"public" or "private" information. The second approach fo-
cuses instead on the status of the plaintiff in the defamation
suit. This approach analyzes whether the defamed individual
is a "public" or "private" figure. It includes some kind of sub-
ject matter inquiry within the analysis to determine the plain-
tiff's status.
The rationale attending either approach is that speech in-
volving "public" issues or "public" individuals deserves some
constitutional margin of error. Conversely, false speech in-
volving "private" issues or "private" individuals may properly
be subordinated to reputational and privacy interests. In
these cases, constitutional protections are significantly
reduced.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,8 the
Supreme Court severely restricted, if not completely with-
drew, constitutional protection in defamation actions that "do
not involve matters of public concern.' Unfortunately, the
Court has offered minimal guidance as to the meaning and
application of this term. Just what does constitute "a matter
of public concern?" Like "obscenity," the "public concern"
standard appears to be a construct elusive of definition. The
Justices seem to suggest that, while they may not be able to
define a "public concern," they'll "know it when [they] see
it.",o
6. Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254 (favoring strong press rights) and
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (same) with Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (recognizing stronger protection for reputational
interests).
7. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
8. 472 U.S. at 749.
9. Id. at 763.
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In his dissent in Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 774 Justice Brennan strongly opposed the "public concern" test as inappo-
site to defamation cases. He specifically criticized the plurality opinion for its failure to
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This Comment discusses the development of and current
trends in defamation law. Specifically, the Comment analyzes
the "public concern" test recently reintroduced by the
Supreme Court in defamation actions.II After examining how
this test has operated in various jurisdictions,' 2 the Comment
examines several problems inherent in this subject matter ap-
proach. The author theorizes that the public/private distinc-
tions currently employed offer inadequate protection to first
amendment guarantees and to societal rights to protect its
members' reputation interests as well. In conclusion, the au-
thor suggests changes to better accommodate these competing
interests.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IN DEFAMATION LAW
A. New York Times to Gertz
At common law, courts attempted to balance the compet-
ing values of individual reputational interests and societal in-
terests in obtaining relevant information.13  An elaborate
system of privileges evolved to protect defamation defend-
ants. 14 However, reputational interests enjoyed significantly
greater protection; defamation defendants who fell outside the
cloak of these privileges were held to a standard of strict liabil-
ity without regard to fault.' 5
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court introduced a
constitutional dimension to the area of defamation law. In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'6 the Court held that public
define this standard. Id. at 784-85 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
11. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749.
12. This comment discusses the public interest doctrine as applied in defamation
law. A similar doctrine not discussed here is applied in tortious invasion of privacy
actions. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
13. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
KEETON].
14. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-612 (1977).
15. See KEETON, supra note 13.
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Respondent Sullivan, a Montgomery, Alabama police
commissioner, had filed a defamation action after a full-page advertisement appeared in
petitioner's newspaper. The ad, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," appealed for pub-
lic support of the civil rights movement. The ad alleged maltreatment of southern black
students engaged in non-violent demonstrations and contained several inaccurate state-
ments. Although Sullivan was not named in the ad, he contended that a reference to
"police" imputed the student abuse to him. At trial, the jury awarded Sullivan
1987]
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officials 7 must prove that critics of their official conduct pub-
lished with "actual malice."'" The Court grounded its deci-
sion in the free speech and press rights of the first amendment
as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 19
The Court recognized the "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open."20
The Court further recognized that within a self-governing
society, vigorous debate on public issues would inevitably give
rise to some factual misinformation.2' It held that the publi-
cation at issue which protested racial discrimination - "one
of the major public issues of our time"22 - was worthy of
$500,000 - the full amount claimed. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Alabama Supreme Court's order affirming the verdict. New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. In New York Times, the plaintiff-respondent was an elected public official. The
holding of this case extends to appointed officials as well. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966). However, not all public employees are "public officials" subject to the
actual malice rule, even if they are defamed in relation to their official conduct. See,
e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (holding federally-funded research
director to be private individual). The Supreme Court has expressly declined at least
twice to specify the precise scope of "public official" status within the constitutional
framework. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23; Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85. See
also, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Who is a Public Official or Otherwise Within the
Federal Constitutional Rule Requiring Public Officials to Show Malice, 19 A.L.R.3d
1361 (1968) for state court treatment of this issue.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court defined this standard as
"knowledge [of falsity] ... or reckless disregard of whether [the alleged defamation] was
false or not." Id. at 280.
The actual malice (or "constitutional malice") standard is a subjective inquiry into
the publisher's state of mind. It is not destroyed by the presence of animus or ill will.
The plaintiff is held to a "convincing clarity" quantum of proof. New York Times, 376
U.S. at 285-86. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) for later judicial development of this standard.
In their concurring opinions in New York Times, Justices Black and Douglas would
have extended protection even further than the "actual malice" standard. They advo-
cated an absolute privilege for citizens and the press to "criticize officials and discuss
public affairs with impunity." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 296 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
19. See supra note 2. The Sullivan court rejected respondent's contentions that the
case was unworthy of constitutional scrutiny because it was a private civil action and
because the publication at issue was a paid commercial advertisement. New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66.
20. Id. at 270.
21. Id. at 271.
22. Id.
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constitutional protection and did not forfeit this insulation be-
cause of the factual falsity of some of its statements.23
Justice Brennan, who authored the opinion, stated that
some erroneous information "must be protected if the free-
doms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need... to survive.' "24 The Court theorized that the threat
of "virtually unlimited" 25 defamation judgments would create
media "self-censorship."
2 6
New York Times clearly offered a qualified constitutional
privilege for defamatory publication. However, the precise
boundary of that privilege was unclear. State and lower fed-
eral courts were particularly divided on the applicability of
New York Times to "public figures" other than "public offi-
cials."' 27 The confusion prompted the Supreme Court to ad-
dress this issue in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts28 and its
companion case Associated Press v. Walker.29 The Court con-
cluded that the similarity of the issues in these cases to the
issues involved in New York Times warranted extension of the
constitutional protection to "public figures" who were not
public officials.3 °
23. Id.
24. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)).
25. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
26. Id.
27. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 n.1 (1967).
28. Id. at 130.
29. Id. In Curtis, the plaintiff was a well-known and respected former football
coach and the then athletic director at the University of Georgia. The defendant pub-
lished an article in the Saturday Evening-Post charging Butts with "fixing" a college
football game. In Walker, the defendant dispatched an "eye-witness" news report
which named plaintiff Walker as the leader of a violent crowd at the University of
Mississippi. Walker, a retired army general, allegedly opposed federal marshals as they
sought to effectuate a court decree ordering the student enrollment of a black youth.
The Supreme Court noted that the "public interest" in both cases was as great as that
involved in New York Times. Id. at 154. The Court found that both claimants com-
manded this "public interest" independent of the respective publications and would
have been labeled "public figures" under ordinary tort law. In addition to the "continu-
ing public interest" both claimants commanded, both had sufficient media access to
countermand the defamatory statements. Id. at 155. Other considerations included
Butts' prominent position and Walker's voluntary involvement in "an important public
controversy." Id.
30. 388 U.S. at 155. In his plurality opinion, Justice Harlan advocated a lower
standard somewhere between negligence and actual malice. Chief Justice Warren's con-
1987]
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In New York Times and Curtis, the plaintiffs' status deter-
mined the scope of constitutional protection afforded their
critics. The "public" issues surrounding these figures merely
provided a rationale for extending the protections. However,
four years after Curtis was decided, the Court abandoned the
plaintiff-status analysis in favor of a subject-matter inquiry in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.31 The Court applied the ac-
tual malice standard in a defamation case involving neither a
public official nor a public figure. 32 The Court rejected the
public/private distinctions as an artificial means to ascertain
interest in "public issues."' 33 The Court stated:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual
is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
"voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's pri-
mary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the con-
duct of the participant and the content, effect, and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior ano-
nymity or notoriety .... Whether the person involved is a
famous large-scale magazine distributor or a "private" busi-
nessman running a comer newsstand has no relevance in as-
certaining whether the public has an interest in the issue.
Although Rosenbloom did not command a majority of the
Court,35 the five members who voted to affirm the court of
appeals agreed on the preliminary question of the reach of
New York Times to "matters of public or general interest."
Justice Marshall, however, in a dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Stewart, severely criticized the "public or general in-
curring opinion prevailed on the actual malice standard, however, when Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan and White joined in that portion of his opinion. Id. at 162.
31. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
32. Id. at 32-33. The petitioner, a distributor of nudist magazines, filed suit after he
was characterized as a "smut peddler" on defendant's radio station. Respondent's
broadcast followed the arrest of Rosenbloom for violating a Philadelphia obscenity ordi-
nance. Id.
33. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41.
34. Id. at 43. The "public or general interest" in the case at bar involved peti-
tioner's arrest. See supra note 32.
35. The eight participating justices wrote five separate opinions. Justice Brennan's
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, and was delivered as
the judgment of the Court. Rosenbloom represents the greatest number of justices to
join in a single opinion. See Comment, Public Status Over Time: A Single Approach to
the Retention Problem in Defamation and Privacy Law, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 951, 954
n.18.
[Vol. 70:647
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terest test."' 36 Justice Marshall was primarily concerned that
lower court ad hoc analysis of what constituted public interest
would involve courts in the dangerous business of deciding
"what information [was] relevant to self-government. 37
Without specifically overruling Rosenbloom, the Court re-
pudiated the "public concern" test three years later and re-
turned to a plaintiff-status analysis.3a In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,39 the Court withdrew the constitutional malice
protection from cases involving private figure plaintiffs. The
Court's underlying rationale was two-fold: first, private indi-
viduals had little opportunity to redress the harm caused by
defamation through self-help; conversely, public figures, like
public officials, had "significantly greater access to the chan-
nels of effective communication" 40 to contradict or correct er-
roneous statements. Second, private individuals had not
assumed an increased risk of injury. Public figures, like public
officials, invited attention and comment through their volun-
tary involvement in the public sector; therefore, they had re-
linquished some interest in protecting their good names.4
36. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
37. Id. at 79. Justice Marshall additionally criticized the "public interest test" as
inadequate for the protection of individual reputational interests. Id.
38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also McChrystal,
Reconciling Defamation Law and the Free Enterprise System when the Media Provides
Consumer or Investor Information, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 183 (1986). Professor Mc-
Chrystal asserts that although the Gertz Court characterized the Rosenbloom standard
as a minority position even on the Rosenbloom Court, "[t]his is something of a hoax."
Id. at 188 n.23. He suggests that when one considers Justice Black's concurring opinion
advocating total libel immunity for the media, coupled with Justice Douglas' probable
opinion had he participated, the Rosenbloom standard actually had greater support than
Gertz. That is, Gertz, a five to four decision, obtained a majority only because Justice
Blackmun felt obligated to join in the plurality opinion to create one. Id.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323. In Gertz, petitioner was a prominent attorney represent-
ing relatives of a youth murdered by a Chicago police officer in civil proceedings against
the officer. Respondent published a magazine article alleging that the trial was a
"frame-up" by petitioner as part of a Communist conspiracy to discredit local police.
After the jury returned a verdict for petitioner, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that petitioner failed to show actual malice required by New
York Times and Curtis. The court of appeals affirmed. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
41. Id. at 345. The rationale underlying the public/private distinctions (i.e., self-
help and assumption of risk) were addressed and criticized in the plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom three years earlier. Justice Brennan stated:
The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a public official or public
figure to give effect to the first amendment's function to encourage ventilation of
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The Court concluded that as long as the states did not im-
pose liability without fault, they were free to define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability in private figure
actions.42 Justice Powell, who wrote for the majority, outlined
the test to ascertain public figure status. The test focused pri-
marily on "the nature and extent of an individual's participa-
tion in [a] particular [public] controversy giving rise to the
defamation. ' 43 Gertz restricted recovery of punitive and pre-
public issues, not because the public official has any less interest in protecting his
reputation than an individual in private life. While the argument that public
figures need less protection because they can command media attention to
counter criticism may be true for some very prominent people, even then it is the
rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions,
and corrections are not "hot" news, and rarely receive the prominence of the
original story. When the public official or public figure is a minor functionary,
or has left the position that put him in the public eye ... the argument loses all
of its force.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46. The Court in Gertz virtually ignored Justice Brennan's
observations.
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. The vast majority of courts have adopted a negligence
standard for cases involving private figure plaintiffs. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix News-
papers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309; 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. App. 1980); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw.
522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975);
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); McCall v. Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney
& Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps, 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla.
1976); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v.
Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123
(1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981); Taskett v. King Broadcast-
ing Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318
N.W.2d 141 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
Three states have retained the Rosenbloom standard requiring plaintiffs to show ac-
tual malice in cases involving a matter of "public concern." See Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, -, 538 P.2d 450, 457 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, 162 Ind. App. 671, -, 321 N.E.2d 580,
586 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82
Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978).
New York has adopted a "gross irresponsibility" standard for private individuals
where the case involves a matter of public concern. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-
Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
43. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. In Gertz, the Court identified two classes of public
figures. Individuals in the first category have achieved such prominence and pervasive
fame or notoriety that they are "public figure[s] for all purposes and in all contexts."
Id. at 351. Examples of individuals in this category include the claimants in Curtis and
Walker. The other category includes individuals who would otherwise be classified as
[Vol. 70:647
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sumed damages as well. The Court held that the first amend-
ment requires courts to hold plaintiffs to an actual malice
standard to recover these damages. 44
Although Gertz enunciated rules providing greater prom-
ise to defamation claimants than Rosenbloom offered, it ap-
peared that defamatory statements in any context merited
some constitutional protection. That is, common law rules
permitting recovery on the basis of strict liability45 seemed to
be abrogated in favor of a rule requiring plaintiffs to show
fault. However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders,46 the Court held that the Gertz safeguards as to
proof of damages do not apply when "defamatory statements
do not involve matters of public concern." 47 The extent to
which Greenmoss Builders has also removed constitutional
protections as to liability is unclear. Moreover, the resurrec-
tion of the "public concern" test48 raises several issues and
problems discussed in the following sections.
"private" but for their voluntary involvement in a "public controversy" in order to
influence the outcome. These individuals are "public figures" for the range of issues
related to the controversy. The test for limited-purpose figures involves a two-step anal-
ysis. First, courts must ascertain whether a particular "public controversy" existed. If
so, the nature and extent of the putative plaintiff's involvement in the controversy is
examined. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Thus, the Gertz test constitutes a plaintiff status
analysis which includes a subject matter inquiry ("public controversy").
The Court has reemphasized the narrow applicability of "actual malice" to private
figures in post-Gertz decisions. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), a
wealthy socialite's divorce proceedings were not a public controversy within the mean-
ing of Gertz, despite the fact that plaintiff herself called press conferences to discuss
them with the media. Nor may the defendant create a "public controversy" by the very
publication that defames an individual. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979). See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) and
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 898 (1980) for later judicial treatment of the "public controversy" analysis.
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
45. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
46. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
47. Id. at 763.
48. Federal and state courts generally have employed the terms "public interest" or
"public concern" interchangeably to effect presumably the same meaning. Compare
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("public interest") and Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199,
341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) ("public concern"). While there may
be a qualitative distinction between the two terms, this Comment also refers to them
alternately. However, matters that are "of concern to" or "in the interest of" the public




In Greenmoss Builders, a construction contractor sued
Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, for circulating a
false credit report to five subscribers. The report erroneously
attributed a bankruptcy petition filed by respondent Green-
moss Builders' former employee to the contractor personally.
Dun & Bradstreet's employee, a seventeen-year-old high
school student, prepared the mistaken report which the
agency failed to verify in accordance with its own routine
practice. When respondent learned of the error, he requested
both a correction and a list of recipients of the erroneous re-
port. Dun & Bradstreet issued a corrective notice to the five
firms, stating that the contractor "continued in business as
usual. ' 49 However, petitioner refused to divulge to the con-
tractor the names of firms who had received the false report.
Greenmoss Builders then sued for defamation in a Vermont
state court.
At trial, the jury awarded respondent $50,000 in presumed
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The judge
granted petitioner's motion for a new trial, agreeing that its
instructions allowed the jury to award these damages on a
lesser showing than actual malice." The Vermont Supreme
Court reversed, finding Gertz5t to be inapplicable because
credit reporting agencies were not the "type of media worthy
of First Amendment protection" as contemplated by New
York Times and its progeny. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, os-
tensibly to eliminate confusion attending "lower courts about
when the protections of Gertz apply. ' 53 In affirming the deci-
See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975); Rouch v. Enquirer &
News of Battle Creek, 137 Mich. App. 39, -, 357 N.W.2d 794, 801 (1984).
49. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 751-53.
50. The trial judge expressed doubts as to the applicability of the Gertz rule requir-
ing proof of actual malice but granted the motion " '[b]ecause of... dissatisfaction with
its charge and ... conviction that the interests of justice require[d] it.' " Id. at 752.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. 66, 73-74, 461 A.2d
414, 417-18 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
53. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 753. The Court then cited state cases with
contrary holdings as to the applicablility of Gertz to non-media defendants. Id. at 752
n.1. However, the plurality opinion probably created further confusion on this issue;
nowhere in the opinion did Justice Powell directly address the applicability of Gertz on
[Vol. 70:647
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sion of the Vermont Supreme Court, Justice Powell's plurality
opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, noted
that constitutional safeguards mandated by earlier cases (New
York Times through Gertz) all involved expression "on a mat-
ter of undoubted public concern," or "public speech."' 4 The
speech involved in the case at bar was of "purely private"55
concern, the plurality stated, meriting less constitutional pro-
tection.5 6 The plurality concluded that the rule enunciated in
Gertz conditioning recovery of presumed or punitive damages
a defendant-status basis. The opinion did emphasize distinguishing characteristics of
"credit reporting" from other types of communication, however. Id. at 761-63.
Although the distinctions were carefully couched in language about types of protected
speech (a subject matter analysis), the plurality opinion smacks of a defendant-status
analysis as well. ("[T]he market provides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting
agency to be accurate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors." Id. (empha-
sis added)).
Justice White, in an opinion concurring with the result, and Justice Brennan, in
dissent, ignored the defendant-status distinction drawn by the plurality and focused on
Justice Powell's subject matter standard. See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 772-73,
784-86 (White, J., concurring, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissent-
ing). Justice White stated:
Wisely, in my view, Justice Powell does not rest his application of a different rule
here on a distinction drawn between media and nonmedia defendants. On that
issue, I agree with Justice Brennan that the First Amendment gives no more
protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their
freedom of speech. None of our cases affords such a distinction; to the contrary,
the Court has rejected it at every turn.
Id. at 773 (footnote omitted).
Thus, if the "confusion" causing the Court to hear the case was eliminated to any
extent, it was only because the concurring and dissenting opinions created a five-mem-
ber position on this issue.
54. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 757 n.4 (emphasis in the original).
55. Id. at 759. The plurality failed to define the terms and "private speech" and
"private concern" anywhere in its opinion. Justice Brennan severely criticized this in
his dissent. He observed that "[w]ithout explaining what is a 'matter ofpublic concern,'
the plurality opinion proceeds to serve up a smorgasbord of reasons why the speech at
issue here is not .. " Id. at 785 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original).
Nor did the plurality offer a meaningful test to help classify public and private con-
cerns. The opinion merely stated that the classification would depend on the "content,
form, and context [of the expression] ... as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 761
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)). The guidance the plurality
offered here was inadequate. Moreover, as the dissent pointed out, the case from which
the plurality drew its "test" explicitly limited the public/private distinction to the con-
text of government employment situations. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 789-90
n.14.
56. See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 758-59
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on a showing of actual malice was inapplicable in cases that
did "not involve matters of public concern. 57
The plurality treated the issue in Greenmoss Builders as a
question of first impression outside the scope of Gertz. 8 Jus-
tice Brennan strongly rejected this contention in his dissent.
Even Justice White, who was expressly dissatisfied with Gertz
and thought it should be overruled, 59 admitted in his
concurrence:
It is interesting that Justice Powell declines to follow the
Gertz approach in this case. I had thought the decision in
Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false
statements of fact injurious to reputation, whether the state-
ment is made privately or publicly and whether or not it im-
plicates a matter of public importance.6"
The dissent in Greenmoss Builders sharply criticized the
reintroduction of the public interest or concern test. The criti-
cism first focused on the lack of definitional guidance for this
standard.61 Moreover, Justice Brennan believed that the pub-
lic's concern for the financial health of its community prop-
erly justified protection for Dun & Bradstreet's credit report
under "any reasonable definition of 'public concern' consistent
with ... precedents."62
The dissent then criticized the elimination of restrictions
on presumed and punitive damages. Relying on Gertz, Justice
Brennan discussed the chilling effect on speech that punitive
damages in defamation actions promoted. He believed these
damages to be "wholly irrelevant"63 to the state interest in pro-
57. Id. at 763.
58. Id. at 757. The Court stated: "We have never considered whether the Gertz
balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern."
Id.
59. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 773. Justice White had dissented in Gertz,
believing that the first amendment did not require protection of defamatory statements
involving private individuals. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 398 (Burger, C.J., Douglas, Bren-
nan & White, JJ., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger, who filed a dissenting opinion in Gertz, also expressed his be-
lief that Gertz should be overruled. See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 764 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
60. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 772.
61. See supra note 55.
62. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 789.
63. Id. at 794 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
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tecting its citizens and would have limited respondent to ac-
tual damages proved. He concluded that first amendment
values would be unnecessarily diminished if courts were free
to award unrestrained damages on an ad hoc basis.64 The dis-
senting opinion in Greenmoss Builders raised several salient
problems that were given superficial treatment in the plurality
opinion.
To what extent has the Supreme Court deconstitutional-
ized defamation law? Under Gertz, a plaintiff had to show
some degree of fault to recover any damages. 6- The facts in
Greenmoss Builders strongly indicate that Dun & Bradstreet
negligently disseminated the credit report.66 Given that the
Court held that Gertz was inapplicable, does it follow that the
same result would be obtained where no fault of the defendant
is shown? May a plaintiff now recover under the common law
rule of strict liability67 where "defamatory statements do not
involve matters of public concer?" 68 Justice White's concur-
ring opinion supports this interpretation. He stated,
"[a]lthough Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability
of the Gertz rule with respect to presumed and punitive dam-
ages, it must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of
fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases
such as this." 69
The applicability of the Greenmoss Builders decision to
public figures and public officials is equally unclear. Nothing
in the opinion limits the holding to private individuals.
Would the same result be obtained if Dun & Bradstreet issued
an erroneous credit report declaring the bankruptcy of enter-
tainer Frank Sinatra, for example? Of President Ronald Rea-
gan? The Greenmoss Builders opinion appears to require a
threshold subject matter inquiry regardless of plaintiff status.
The state of any individual's personal finances arguably consti-
64. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ., dissenting).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that anyone would
seriously dispute that a reasonable credit reporting agency would verify a report pre-
pared by a relatively inexperienced high school student.
67. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
68. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 763.
69. Id. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring).
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tutes a private rather than a public concern. If so, the Green-
moss decision potentially permits both "public" and "private"
individuals to recover presumed and punitive damages absent
proof of actual malice and possibly even without proof of
negligence.
Furthermore, the decision purportedly eschews a media/
non-media distinction.7 ° If so, the same result should occur if
the Wall Street Journal had falsely published the same credit
report. If, as suggested above, the threshold subject matter
inquiry is made regardless of plaintiff's status, what result
would be obtained if the Wall Street Journal published an er-
roneous report on the personal credit of Frank Sinatra or
President Reagan? Are these also "private" concerns unwor-
thy of a constitutional malice standard?
The plurality opinion considered the limited availability of
the report an important factor in its classification of the
"speech. ' 71 The recipients of Dun & Bradstreet's credit re-
ports agreed not to disseminate information received. The
plurality's emphasis on this factor suggests that they em-
ployed an audience analysis in their decision. One author has
characterized this decision as anomalous in that the Court ap-
pears to extend increased constitutional protection when false
information reaches a greater number of people.72
Finally, a significant problem attending the Greenmoss
Builders decision is its apparent resurrection of a previously
rejected standard. 73 The "public interest or general concern"
standard is ill-defined and has generated confusion and incon-
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
71. See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 762. The plurality found there was no
"strong interest in the free flow of commercial information" because the credit report
was available only to subscribers who could not futher disseminate the information. Id.
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976)).
Most states recognize a common law qualified privilege protecting credit agencies
that circulate false information. The privilege is based on the recognition of a legitimate
business need for a free flow of credit information. See generally Annotation, Suffi-
ciency of Showing Malice or Lack of Reasonable Care to Support Credit Agency's Liabil-
ity for Circulating Inaccurate Credit Report, 40 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1971). The State of
Vermont, in which the Greenmoss Builders case arose, does not recognize this privilege.
72. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.35 (1986).
73. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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sistencies within lower courts.74 These concerns, discussed in
section III, led the Court to repudiate this problematic stan-
dard only three years after its inception in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc. 75
C. Philadelphia Newspapers
Subsequent to the Greenmoss Builders decision, the Court
decided another case in which the public interest test was em-
ployed. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,76 the
Supreme Court held that where a media defendant's defama-
tory speech involves a matter of public concern, private
figures have the burden of proving falsity of the speech as well
as fault. 77 In this case, a franchisor corporation and its fran-
chisees sued a newspaper for publishing a series of articles
linking the plaintiffs to organized crime and political corrup-
tion. In a 5-4 decision, 78 the Supreme Court reversed Penn-
sylvania's highest court, agreeing with the trial court that the
Pennsylvania statute allocating the burden of proof of falsity
to the defendant was unconstitutional. The Court stated:
One can discern in these decisons two forces that may
reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First
Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public of-
ficial or figure, or is instead a private figure. The second is
whether the speech at issue is of public concern. When the
speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public offi-
cial or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the
plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before recover-
ing damages from a media defendant than is raised by the
common law. When the speech is of public concern but the
74. See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
75. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. The majority of the Court in
Gertz believed that the public interest or concern test articulated in Rosenbloom inade-
quately served both first amendment values and states' interests in redressing reputa-
tional harm. Id. One commentator states that the Gertz majority sensed the
Rosenbloom standard nearly destroyed the common law of defamation. See Eaton, The
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1409 (1975) [hereinafter Eaton].
76. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
77. Id. at 1563.
78. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in
which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined.
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plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the Constitution still
supplants the standards of the common law, but the consti-
tutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less
forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the
speech is of public concern. When the speech is of exclu-
sively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as
in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not
necessarily force any change in at least some of the features
of the common-law landscape.79
Interestingly, three out of the four justices in the dissent-
ing opinion were in either the plurality or concurrences in
Greenmoss Builders. The dissent sharply criticized the major-
ity's reliance "on the discredited analysis of the Rosenbloom
plurality,"80 stating that "where private-figure libel plaintiffs
are involved, the First Amendment does not 'requir[e] us to
tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech' merely be-
cause that speech addresses 'matters of public concern.' "8
Unfortunatley, the Philadelphia Newspapers case offered
no further guidance on the public interest test and suffered the
same analytical infirmities discussed earlier and in the follow-
ing section.
II. THE "PUBLIC INTEREST OR CONCERN" STANDARD
A. How the Standard has Operated in State Courts
Even before the United States Supreme Court introduced
the "public interest" standard in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,82 some state and federal courts extended increased pro-
tection to defendants when defamatory statements involved
"public issues" or "public interests. ' 83 Most of the courts
treated the cases as a logical extension of the principles ex-
pressed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 84 and Curtis Pub-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); United Medical
Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968); cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska
1966); Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1970); All Diet Food Distrib. Inc. v. Time, 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1967).
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
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lishing Co. v. Butts.8 5 The Supreme Court of Alaska grounded
its decision instead upon the rationale attending the common
law privilege of fair comment.8 6
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 7 permitted states to define
their own standards of liability so long as strict liability was
not applied.88 Five states have expanded first amendment pro-
tections in defamation actions beyond those required in
Gertz.8 9 Indiana, 90 Colorado, 91 Alaska92 and Michigan 93 have
expressly adopted the Rosenbloom standard of liability. 94
These jurisdictions require plaintiffs to prove actual malice
where defamatory expressions relate to a matter of public in-
terest or concern. 95 New York conditions recovery in these
instances upon proof that the defendant was "grossly
irresponsible. 96
Three general themes appear consistently throughout defa-
mation cases decided in these jurisdictions. First, the judici-
ary does not define the public interest test or offer meaningful
guidelines for its application. Second, the opinions in jurisdic-
tions employing the test supply very little analysis to support
85. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See Cohen, 63
Misc. 2d at 96, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19;All Diet Food Distrib., Inc., 56 Misc. 2d at 824,
290 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48.
86. Pearson, 413 P.2d at 713. See generally KEETON, supra note 13, § 115 for a
discussion on the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern.
87. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
88. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 84-87, 90.
90. See AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975).
91. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
92. See West v. Northern Publishing Co., 487 P.2d 1304 (Ala. 1971).
93. See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693
(1978).
94. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
95. In addition, a "public interest" privilege has been recognized under Utah law
when public health and safety was involved and when there was a "legitimate issue"
with respect to governmental bodies and public institutions. See Seegmiller v. KSL,
Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981). California has recognized a statutorily qualified
privilege where publications concerned a matter of public interest. See Rollenhagen v.
City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
96. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d
569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). Under the "gross irresponsibility" standard, a plaintiff
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant acted "without due
considerations for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties." Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
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the conclusions courts reach. Third, the public interest doc-
trine has been so broadly applied that, with very little excep-
tion, practically every aspect of human conduct is held to be a
matter of general public interest or concern. Several examples
of these three themes are discussed below.
In Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
outline the parameters of the public interest or concern stan-
dard.97 Defamation cases decided in jurisdictions employing a
threshold subject matter inquiry exhibit a similar definitional
deficiency even within principal cases that adopt the
standard. 98
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.,99 the case in
which New York adopted the public interest standard, is one
such example. The court of appeals held that "where the con-
tent of [an] article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate
public concern, which is reasonably related to matters war-
ranting public exposition" t°° a private individual is held to a
"gross irresponsibility" standard of proof.101 The court of ap-
peals offered no test to ascertain the boundaries of "legiti-
mate" public concern. The phrase "warranting public
exposition"' 12 begs the same definitional question.10 3
The Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the Rosenbloom
standard in AAFO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. North-
97. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44-45.
98. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
99. 38 N.Y.2d at 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61. In Chapadeau, the plain-
tiff was a public school teacher who had been arrested and charged with felony criminal
possession of heroin and a hypodermic needle. The defamatory publication at issue
erroneously linked the plaintiff with a group of others arrested on misdemeanor drug
charges. Id.
100. Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (emphasis added).
101. See AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d
580.
102. Chapadeau, 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
103. In Chapadeau, the court of appeals found that in light of the plaintiff's "occu-
pation and the nature of the crime his arrest was a matter of public interest."
Chapadeau, 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 570, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. A lower court
decision decided subsequent to Chapadeau stated that an issue was "clearly" of public
concern if it involved "public business." See Cottom v. Meredith Corp., 65 A.D.2d 165,
-, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (1978). The court followed this circular definition with a dis-
cussion of matters that do not constitute "public concern," namely "gossip" and "mat-
ters directed to a limited audience." Id.
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west Publications. 104 The court stated that '"tjhe public inter-
est is necessarily broad" ° 5 and simply cited previous cases
decided under Rosenbloom. This court held that once a public
or general interest was found, it became "unimportant ...
whether the public ha[d] a legitimate interest in [the] issue."' 10 6
Not surprisingly, no case decided in this jurisdiction has been
held to be a "private concern."
The Supreme Court of Colorado has been equally unwil-
ling to articulate a definition of the public interest standard.
In the case that adopted this standard, plaintiffs, owners of an
antique shop, brought a defamation action against a media de-
fendant who published a series of articles and editorial let-
ters.10 7 The publication charged that plaintiffs knowingly
resold antiques that were burgled from an elderly woman.
Without discussion, the court merely stated that it agreed
with the trial court that the subject involved a matter of public
interest."18 In a more recent case in the same jurisdiction, the
Colorado Supreme Court expressly declined to define the sub-
ject matter standard.10 9 The court stated, "We need not pre-
cisely define the outer boundaries of the term 'public or
general concern' at this point, for the activities involved here
are clearly within them."' 10
Another significant problem accompanies the consistent
absence of judicial definition of the public interest standard.
The second theme recurring throughout the Rosenbloom-type
jurisdictions is the virtual absence of analysis within the cases
that pass on the issue.I1 I A few court decisions have sprinkled
104. 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975).
In AAFCO, a furnace company filed a defamation suit after a media defendant published
a series of ten articles suggesting that plaintiff's heater might have caused a house fire
that killed two people. Id. at 673, 321 N.E.2d at 582.
105. Id. at 686, 321 N.E.2d at 590.
106. Id. at 680, 321 N.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added).
107. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
108. Id. at 456.
109. Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982).
110. Id. at 1108. In this case, real estate dealers sued a media defendant after it
published an article questioning the propriety of plaintiffs' financial dealings. Id. at
1104.
111. See supra notes 107-09.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
occasional explanations or reasons among their decisions.' 1 2
However, the vast majority of opinions employing a threshold
subject matter inquiry summarily recount the facts and then
hold that the issues surrounding a case are "clearly," ' 1 3 "un-
questionably,"' 1 4  or "certainly" 15  of public interest or
concern.
In his dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom, Justice Marshall
strongly criticized the subject matter standard because, inter
alia, it required courts ("not anointed with any extraordinary
prescience")" t 6 to determine the legitimacy of public interest
in a particular topic." 7 In Gertz, Justice Powell reiterated
Justice Marshall's criticism and further stated that he
"doubt[ed] the wisdom of committing this task to the con-
science of judges." '' These criticisms are particularly well-
founded when lower court judges making ad hoc decisions
about constitutional safeguards offer little rationale to support
their holdings." 9 Arguably, some matters are of such excep-
tional importance to society that a judge may properly decide
a priori and without discussion that the issue is or is not of
112. See, e.g., Diversified Management, Inc., 653 P.2d at 1103; Cottom v. Meredith
Corp., 65 A.D.2d 165, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1978); Cohen v. New York Hearld Tribune, 63
Misc. 2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1970).
113. See, e.g., Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D. Ala. 1979) (involving al-
leged drug smuggling); Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d 294, -, 445 N.Y.S.2d
156, 161-62 (1981) (involving intermediate care facility for mentally handicapped
children).
114. See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, -, 416 N.E.2d 557, 560,
435 N.Y.S.2d 556, 559 (1980) (involving international heroin trafficking); DeLuca v.
New York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, -, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1981) (involving
medically disabled public school teacher improperly drawing salary); Commercial Pro-
gramming Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 687, 367
N.Y.S.2d 986, 996 (1975) (involving alleged deceptive practices of vocational schools).
115. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (involving the qualities and marketing of health foods); Goldman v.
New York Post Corp., 58 A.D.2d 769, 770, 396 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (1977) (where real
estate operators were called "sex lords" in article on massage parlors); All Diet Food
Distrib., Inc. v. Time, 56 Misc.2d 821, 824, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445, 448 (1967) (involving
health food store/restaurant). See also Freeze Right Refrigeration & Air Conditioning
Servs., Inc. v. City of New York, 101 A.D.2d 175, 475 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1984) (alleged
deceptive practices of air-conditioner repair shops).
116. 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
119. See supra notes 105-09.
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public interest or concern. Nevertheless, this exceptional type
of decision has unfortunately become the rule.
The definitional and analytical problems discussed above
relate to and possibly create a third difficulty. The public con-
cern standard is consistently applied so broadly that private/
public distinctions are virtually meaningless. In all but the
most unusual cases, many topics are discussed simultaneously.
The breadth a court will extend to a particular issue often de-
termines whether the matter is of "public" or "private"
concern.
The facts in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc. 2 o illustrate this
precise problem. In this case, the former wife of a mentally ill
patient sued a newspaper and its reporter after defendants
published a series of articles concerning the state's program of
transferring some mentally ill patients from hospitals to nurs-
ing homes. One article featured plaintiff's ex-husband who
had been transferred under this program. The article stated
that psychiatrists attributed the patient's condition to a
"messy divorce and the fact that [the patient's son] killed him-
self because his mother dated other men." 121 The New York
Court of Appeals held that the transfer of mental patients to
nursing homes and their experiences with the elderly and in-
firm was "a subject of public business and concern, itself
plainly warranting public exposition." 122 The court further
held that the "familiar journalistic technique of featuring the
experiences of a single individual, as exemplifying in human
terms the plight of many [did not] change the character of the
article." 123
No one would dispute that a state program dealing with
the mentally ill or the elderly and infirm is of public concern
under any reasonable definition. However, the defamatory
statements in Gaeta had absolutely nothing to do with the
transfer program or the patient's experiences in the nursing
home. The court of appeals broadened the scope of an other-
wise legitimate inquiry by impermissibly including personal
120. 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984).
121. Id. at -, 465 N.E.2d at 803, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The true source of this
"diagnosis" was the patient's sister, not a psychiatrist. Id.




information about an individual completely unrelated to the
article. How did the marital misconduct allegedly committed
by the patient's long-estranged wife even reasonably relate to
the transfer program of the State of New York? The court of
appeals apparently grounded the "reasonable relation"' 124 in
the "familiar journalistic technique"1 25 by singling out one
person to appeal to many. Under this analysis, what personal
information would ever be characterized as "private?" Few
human situations are so distinctive that some others have not
shared similar experiences.
In a case decided by an Indiana appellate court, the de-
fendant, while reporting on alleged political corruption, juxta-
posed photos and statements of the plaintiff, a former Playboy
model and "Miss Hurst Golden Shifter" of the Indianapolis
500 auto race. 126 The article gave the defamatory impression
that the plaintiff engaged in illegal sexual activities. The court
found a public interest existed in the Indianapolis 500, even
though the Indianapolis 500 was not at issue.' 27 Certainly
every interesting area of an individual's life should not be con-
sidered in the subject matter equation. The public interest
here, local political corruption, was unrelated to plaintiff's oc-
cupation and outside interests.
A few courts employing the public interest doctrine have
restricted its scope, however. A federal district court apply-
ing Michigan law held that a matter of public concern existed
when a newspaper published a series of articles linking plain-
tiffs' business with local prostitution activities. 2 8 However, in
its companion case, brought by a woman whose photo was
published in the same series of articles, the court drew the
line. 129 The court refused to extend the public interest privi-
lege where the woman, who was a passerby and not a prosti-
124. See supra text accompanying note 94.
125. Gaeta, 62 N.Y.2d at -, 465 N.E.2d at 805, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
126. See Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. App.
1978).
127. Id. at 1219. The court also found that plaintiff was a public figure under Cur-
tis. Id.
128. Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897, 902 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
129. See Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
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tute, was "not the focus of the alleged public interest
publication.'130
In another case, an appellate court in Michigan refused to
extend the state's public interest privilege in a case where a
newspaper falsely published that plaintiff was arrested for
rape.13 1 The court held that while criminal activities were of
public interest to a certain extent, details of crimes such as the
names of victims and suspects were merely matters the public
found interesting. 132 These statements did not rise to the level
of public interest warranting protection. 33 The distinction
drawn by this court appears to be a sensible approach where
the subject matter at issue is criminal activity. It recognizes
the substantial reputational interest at stake and does not un-
duly restrict press rights. Courts in other jurisdictions em-
ploying a threshold subject matter analysis have consistently
held false criminal charges worthy of constitutional
protection. 134
B. Additional Problems Generated by the Standard
In his dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 35 Justice Marshall predicted that the public interest
standard would require increased judicial supervision and
would generate inconsistent decisions. 136 The problems at-
tending the public interest doctrine have generated much
130. Id. at 914.
131. Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 137 Mich. App. 39, 357 N.W.2d
794 (1984). In this case, plaintiff was arrested for the crime but was not officially
charged. The actual offender was later apprehended. Id. at -, 357 N.W.2d at 797.
132. Id. at -, 357 N.W.2d at 804.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Fazekas v. Crain Consumer Group Div., 583 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.
Ind. 1984) (driver accused of illegally modifying race car); West v. Northern Publishing
Co., 487 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 197 1) (cab company accused of illegally furnishing liquor to
minors); Vinci v. Gannett Co., 71 Misc. 2d 146, 335 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1972) (burglary).
See also Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ala. 1979). In this case, a media
defendant published a wire service story linking plaintiff to international drug traffick-
ing. The district court applied Alaska law in a diversity action and found a public
interest in the series of articles themselves. Id. at 16. In O'Connell v. Gannett Co., 77
Misc. 2d 344, 353 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1974), a case involving a disputed land transaction, the
court also held that the publication itself was the public interest. Id. at 347, 353
N.Y.S.2d at 148.
135. 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 81.
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scholarly criticism.1 37  Commentators have consistently re-
jected the public interest standard as a viable means to achieve
the balanced ends envisioned by New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van. 38  In light of the pervasive definitional and analytical
problems previously discussed, even the few interests that
were held to be "private" concerns would undoubtedly be
characterized as "public" by other courts. Matus v. Triangle
Publications, Inc.,1 39 a case decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court subsequent to Rosenbloom and prior to Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.' 4 discusses this precise problem.
The defendant in Matus was a radio talk show host who
complained on the air about the price that plaintiff, a garage
owner and snowplow operator, had charged to plow his home
driveway.14' Defendant warned listeners to "watch out for
this kind of thing going on." 142 Several listeners then called
the station to relate similar experiences which were discussed
on the air.
The court found the defamatory remarks to be a "matter
of private pique. "143 The court refused to grant constitutional
malice protection and affirmed the judgment. The dissenting
justice would have extended the privilege, believing that "a
dissatisfied customer's mere statement that he was forced to
pay too high a price for a particular service [was not]
actionable." 144
137. See, e.g., Eaton, supra, note 75, at 1349; Nimmer, The Right to Speak From
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968) [hereinafter Nimmer]; Note, Gertz v. Welch: Reviving the
Libel Action, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450 (1975).
138. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Nimmer, supra note 137, at 939-42. Professor Nim-
mer identifies three serious problems attending ad hoc balancing. First, since no rule is
applied, only interests are weighed, creating uncertainty. Second, the balance disfavors
free speech. Finally, Professor Nimmer feels that the judiciary abdicates the balancing
process to the legislature. Id.
139. 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), reh'g denied, (1972).
140. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
141. Matus, 445 Pa. at 386, 286 A.2d at 358. During a newscast break defendant
received a call from his wife informing him of the price. When he returned to the air,
defendant engaged the newscaster in conversation and related the $35 price he had paid.
445 Pa. at 387, 286 A.2d at 359.
142. Id. at 388, 286 A.2d at 359.
143. Id. at 398, 286 A.2d at 365.
144. Id. at 400, 286 A.2d at 365 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently believed
that the defendant had abused his media position. Perhaps if
the radio station's sportscaster, for example, had interrupted a
play-by-play baseball account to air personal consumer griev-
ances, the holding could be reconciled to principles attending
the subject matter analysis, namely, the free flow of "public"
information. Consumer talk shows are broadcast daily
throughout the nation with far more serious complaints of
services and products than in Matus. These open-line media
programs are appropriate forums to discuss consumer infor-
mation. Would the result have changed if, under the facts, a
radio listener had called and discussed Matus' prices? Under
a subject matter analysis, defamatory expression should not
forfeit protection merely because the speaker is also a media
employee. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared to em-
ploy a defendant status inquiry in its opinion. Matus also ex-
emplifies the unpredictability obtained under a public interest
analysis. Justice Marshall predicted this exact problem in his
dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom. 145
CONCLUSION
Justice Marshall's fears have proven to be well-founded;
opinions decided under a threshold subject matter approach
indicate that it is a problematic and unacceptable standard.
The Supreme Court's decision to resurrect the public interest
or concern test in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers 146 was ill-advised. This test has served to enhance neither
first amendment values nor reputational interests. This deci-
sion is particularly disturbing when the floodgate to presumed
and punitive damages is so casually opened.
However, perhaps the solution does not lie in the stan-
dards of liability. More than one commentator has suggested
that an individual's reputation interests would be further
served if an effective forum were provided to defamed parties
to correct erroneous information and to rebut the injurious
speech. 147
145. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
147. See, e.g., Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983); Nim-
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Justice White has twice suggested that standards of proof
be eliminated for defamation plaintiffs who seek merely to vin-
dicate their names through declaratory judgments. 14 8
Although the Court has thus far ignored these recommenda-
tions, perhaps these proponents are right and the solution to
achieving an appropriate balance lies in the area of remedies.
The Court would be well-advised to explore these alternatives
that do not provide undefined restrictions on speech.
The United States Supreme Court has vascillated for too
long on how much protection will be afforded particular
speakers under specific circumstances. This vascillation cre-
ates an imbalance and uncertainty for everyone. The Court
has a responsibility to resolve these uncertainties. Until it
does, protections for first amendment values and for reputa-
tional interests will remain illusory constructs.
DE VONNA JOY
mer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 950 (1968).
148. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 772 n.3 (White,
J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 391-92 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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